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2Purpose of this talk
■ Describe a new, simple solution 
method for two-stage stochastic 
integer programs
■ Motivate and illustrate with a particular 
stochastic, network-interdiction 
problem (will consider one other, too)
■ Illustrate two main thrusts of my 
research, interdiction and SP.
3First: Other work
■ Interdiction of communications 
networks: Physical and cyber-attacks
■ General models and solutions for 
system interdiction and defense
■ General theoretical work on SPs
■ Applications of SP:  Sealift 
deployments subject to bio-attacks
■ Integer programming
4Generic network interdiction 
problem
■ Using limited resources, attack an 
adversary’s network so as to minimize 
the functionality of that network (to the 
adversary).
■ Networks: Road, pipeline, comm
■ Functionality: Max flow, shortest path, 
convoy movement, path existence
■ Attacks: Aerial sorties, cruise missiles, 
special operations
■ Can generalize: “system interdiction”
5Max-flow interdiction
Basic Deterministic Model
on G=(N,A) with artificial arc a = (t,s)
where                                   , and…
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6A Simple Example







Suppose we have enough resource 
to interduck any two arcs
7Max-flow interdiction
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■ Uncertain success or data, SMFI:
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■ Note: Deterministic problems are NP-
complete.  It’s #P-complete to evaluate 
Eh or Eg for fixed x:  These stochastic 
problems are really hard. 
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(some may be integer)
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Probability of kill
■ Assume pk = E[Ĩk] is known
■ Weaponeers know this stuff!
■ Well…
12
Bound on z*,  pessimistic
■ New soln methodology needs bounds
■ From Jensen’s inequality, obtain a 
global upper bound given a “good”   : 
■ Can also use probabilistic bounds
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Bound on z*,  pessimistic
■ Actually, because interdictions are 
binary, and successes/failures are 
binary in SMFI, we can reformulate the 
upper-bound problem and minimize 
that bound via a MIP.
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Bound on z*,  optimistic





min , [ ]  because  is convex in 
min
1 if ( , )
s.t. [ ]





X k A a



















− + + ≥  ∀ = ∈ −












Bounds on z*: Comments
■ Bounds can be improved by 
expanding in terms of conditional 
probabilities, e.g., by conditioning on 
the number of successful 
interdictions.
■ Can use probabilistic bounds; may be 
necessary for other 2SSPs.
■ But, keep it simple for now. 
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Solution methodology, outline
■ BOUND: Find a global upper bnd 
■ ENUMERATE all solns    s.t.                        
call these candidates 
■ SCREEN the candidates (Monte Carlo 
and statistics) to identify the best, or 
the best few 
■ TEST            to determine quality
■ (Or maybe Partially Enumerate, Then 
Screen: PETS.  Or, maybe Bound, 
Enumerate, Then Screen: BETS. )
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Fundamental theorem for PE
■ Theorem 1:     can be optimal for SMFI 
only if                                                         
Proof: Obvious.  QED
■ Theorem leads to finding a set of 
candidate solutions           using the 
algorithm on the next slide.
■ For simplicity, assume that the set of 
feasible interdiction plans defined by X
has cardinality constraint:
xˆ








Alg. to find candidate solutions
1. ← ∅; Find a good  
2. Compute ub      given     (or optimize)
3. Solve                              for            
4. If              print and halt;
5. Add      to 
6. Add constraint
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Alg. to find candidate solutions
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For other 2SSPs, just use other bounds!
20
A better enumeration algorithm
( )
(Or optimize)
Compute , [ ]ˆz h E=′′ x Iz′′
z′
Find a good xˆ
( )s.t. , [ ]ˆ ˆ zX z g E ′′≤∈ =′x x I
Use B&B-like procedure to enumerate all 
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Screening candidate solutions
 For small R we can compute 
exactly for each           : There are only 
2R ways for R attempted interdictions 
to succeed or fail.  Can solve SMFI 
exactly in this case.
 Will describe general statistical 
screening procedures because they 
are necessary for most applications 
of BEST, including more complicated 
interdiction problems (and larger R).
 Seeking a near-optimal set 
( ),ˆ kEg x I
ˆ k ∈x X
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We could do this:
■ Sample the             for each           to 
obtain independent estimates
■ These      are distributed with 
independent t-distributions
■ Reject     that correspond to      being 
“too large”  
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But we will do this:
■ Using CRNs, sample the             for  
each          to obtain estimates
■ Order: 
■ Create difference r.v.s 
■ These       have a joint t-distribution, 
approximately, and we could exploit 
that, but let’s keep things simple, so …
( ),ˆ kh x I




ˆ( , )ˆ ,ˆ
L






= ≈∑ x I x I
1 2 Kh h h≤ ≤ ≤"




■ Reject      as “bad” if confident that           
■ That is,  put                  if not confident that 
■ Let       be the sample s.d. for estimate
■ “Accept”      if  the                            confidence 
interval on       covers 0: 






















■ Overall, we’ll be 100×(1– α)% confident 
that we have not rejected a good 
■ Above procedure depends on Boole-
Bonferroni inequality: not very strong.
■ On the other hand, we used CRNs in 
comparing the     so we have employed 
a useful variance-reduction technique.  
(1 or 2 orders of mag. improvement)






■ Not an issue if K* = 1.
■ Will not cover in this talk, except to 
say that, empirically:
■ All near-optimal solutions in this talk’s 




 No large approximating problems 
with multiple scenarios to solve
 For the most part, we’re solving 
simple bounding models and using 
Monte Carlo to evaluate 2SSPs with 
fixed first-stage variables
 No complicated decompositions 
needed
28
SMFI, computational results (1)
■ Grid network
■ 100 samples for each 
■ uk is uniform[10,100], pk=0.9
■ Only resource constraint:
■ Upper bound optimized
■ VR for screening









SMFI, computation results (2)


















Stochastic plant location (SPL)
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■ Uncertain demand for a single product
■ xi = 1 if plant i to be built, else 0
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SPL, computational results (1)
• 10 candidate plants, choose 5
• 20 customer zones (rvs)
• Demands uniform, ±v% of mean
• Probabilistic UB, Jensen LB =784.7
• v=10: ub=801.9, K=2, K*=1, T=15.6
• v=20: ub=840.0, K=5, K*=1, T=17.4
• v=40: ub=939.9, K=28, K*=1, T=29.7
32
SPL, computational results (2)
• 20 candidate plants, choose 10
• 50 customer zones (rvs)
• Demands uniform, ±v% of mean
• Probabilistic UB, Jensen LB =958.8
• v=10: ub=  966.2, K=3, K*=2, T=133
• v=20: ub=1006.3, K=72, K*=5, T=255
• v=40: ub=1155.1, K=51, K*=17, T=560ª
• ª LB improved to 1097.8
33
Extensions
BEST (PETS, PEST, BETS?) will work for 
any 2SSP provided that
– First-stage variables are binary or integers of 
modest magnitude,
– An optimistic bound is not too hard to 
compute, and
– For fixed x, Monte Carlo sampling is efficient.
■ For optimistic bounds, we use 
Jensen’s ineq. and restricted recourse




■ 2nd-stage integer variables OK
■ Does not depend on distributions: 
If you can generate the rvs, BEST 
works







■ Interdiction of communications 
networks: Physical attacks and cyber-
attacks
■ General models for system interdiction 
and defense
■ General theoretical work on SPs
■ Applications of SP:  Sealift 
deployments subject to bio-attacks
■ Integer programming
